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Voting cycles when a dominant point exists
Vjollca Sadiraj, Jan Tuinstrayand Frans van Windenz
February 2005 Incomplete and Very Preliminary
Abstract
We consider a spatial model of electoral competition between two politi-
cal parties. These parties are incompletely informed about voter preferences
and search adaptively, by means of polling, for those policy platforms which
might make them win the election. We introduce interest groups in this spatial
framework. Di¤erent interest groups coordinate voting behavior and trans-
mit information about voter preferences to the political candidates. Moreover,
organization of voters into di¤erent interest groups occurs endogenously. We in-
vestigate the dynamics of this spatial model of electoral competition by looking
at the mean-dynamics, i.e. by replacing stochastic variables by their expected
values. The resulting Markov process shows that voting cycles exist. The
mechanism driving these voting cycles may explain some empirical regularities
found in the political science literature.
Keywords: Spatial voting models, electoral competition, interest groups, voting
cycles.
JEL classication code: D71; D72; D83.
1 Introduction
Existing models of electoral competition typically make strong assumptions about the
information political parties and voters have regarding issues that are of importance
to their decision making. Take the classical Downs-Hotelling spatial competition
model. In this model, the preferred policy of a voter is modeled as a point in some
kind of policy or issue space. Voters are taken to vote for the party whose policy
platform is closest (e.g. in terms of Euclidean distance) to this ideal point. Each
voter is assumed to be able to evaluate the consequences of all policy positions and to
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have a stable (complete and transitive) preference ordering over all these positions.
In its turn, a political party is assumed to have complete information about the
distribution of the ideal points of the voters when selecting the platform that optimizes
its electoral prospects. These assumptions are extremely demanding and, in fact, not
realistic. Why would parties and candidates spent so much money and e¤ort on
election campaigns, for example, if this were not true? And how precisely do parties
actually get to know the political consequences of alternative policy platforms? With
respect to voters, social interaction may inuence their political preferences, as is
further manifested by hypes and herding behavior.
Although we certainly do not want to argue against the use of simplifying as-
sumptions in exploring political economic issues of interest, we think it is important
also to examine models that take the strong informational constraints in politics into
account. In this paper we will do so using a spatial competition model with two
o¢ ce motivated parties. Starting point is the observation that parties do not just
know what makes voters tick but have to nd out through some kind of polling. Our
model therefore allows for the transmission of information on political preferences
via polling. However, this search activity is costly. For two reasons, voters may be
willing to contribute in the form of e¤ort or money. Firstly, because in this way
they can a¤ect the election outcome (electoral motive). Secondly, by conditioning
their contributions they a¤ect policies (inuence motive). Conditioning takes place
by making contributions only available for polling in that part of the political issue
space that the voter is mostly concerned about. This setup seems quite realistic. For
example, in the case of U.S. presidential elections voters contribute to (new) candi-
dates within parties who are willing to represent their concerns (see e.g. the website
deanforamerica.com), which e¤ectively implies that the amount of polling on policy
stances related to these concerns is increased. If the candidate is successful (s)he will
win the race and can implement the policies preferred by the voters who supported
this candidate. Of course, instead of contributing directly to candidates or parties,
voters may choose an indirect way by supporting intermediary institutions with the
same purpose (see e.g. the website meetup.com). For simplicity, we will not dis-
tinguish between these di¤erent channels, but have voters contribute to an interest
groupwhich conditionally transfers the contributions to the parties. In line with the
evidence presented in Ansolobehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2002), contributions
are not modeled as resulting from an explicit investment calculus, but assumed to
be primarily driven by dissatisfaction with existing policies on issues of particular
concern to the voter. Note that by getting politically involved in this way voters
are likely to identify themselves with the policy stances and institutions they go for.
In our model it is assumed, therefore, that some coordination of voting will occur,
because of the extra weight that voters will attach to these positions on issues in their
votes. Clearly, this coordination of voting may a¤ect policies.
By having political parties experiment before an election with di¤erent policy
positions to improve their chances of winning, our study is related to Kollman, Miller
and Page (1992, 1998). An important goal of their research was to investigate the
relevance of the theoretical chaosresults for multi-dimensional issue spaces, which
predict that, in general, the incumbent would always be defeated by the challenging
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party (see e.g. McKelvey, 1976, 1979, and Schoeld, 1978). Instead of chaos,
however, the simulations of Kollman, Miller and Page (1992) showed convergence
of the partiesplatforms to the center of the distribution of votersideal positions.
Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden (2004) presents an extensive simulation study
of a spatial competition model with endogenous emergence of interest groups. This
simulation study suggests that the presence of interest groups increases the probability
of winning for the challenger and also increases separation between policy platforms.
Moreover, the policy outcome seems to: (a) move in the direction of the center of
the distribution of voter preferences, though at a lower speed; and (b) stabilize at
a distance 0.6 from the center. In this paper we elaborate on these results some
more. We introduce the mean dynamics, where we replace the stochastic elements
of the model by their expected values. This results in a Markov model, for which
we can investigate the steady state distribution and the stability properties. We are
interested in: i) the distance between the policy outcome and the center of the space,
and ii) the probability that the challenger wins an election, both of which can be
derived once the transition and initial probabilities are known. In particular, the
asymptotic properties of the models are of interest. It turns out that the steady
state distribution of policy outcomes depends critically upon the way interest groups
transmit information about the electoral landscape to the political parties. We will
rely on simulations to investigate the relevance of the results for stochastic versions of
the model. Finally, we will show that the model of interest groups may help explain
some stylized factsconcerning empirical data on policy outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the adaptive political
party model is discussed. This model is taken from Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden
(2004). In Section ?? the mean-eld approximations of the stochastic models are
introduced. In Section 3 the dynamics of the specied models are analyzed. Section 4
presents some results that shed light on the emergence of voting cycles in the presence
of the interest groups. Section 5 is concerned with the relevance of the results for the
stochastic models and replication of some stylized facts. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Incompletely informed political parties in spatial compe-
tition
We consider a typical and standard spatial model of electoral competition (for an
introduction into the spatial theory of voting, see Enelow and Hinich, 1984). Policy
platforms are represented as points in an issue space. To keep the model tractable we
restrict our attention to a two-dimensional issue space, with K positions per issue.
Hence, the issue space is X = f1; : : : ; Kg  f1; : : : ; Kg. There is a population of N
voters, which evaluate di¤erent policy platforms according to the weighted distance
to their own preferred policy platform. That is, given the voters ideal point xj 2 X ,
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the utility a voter attaches to a policy outcome y = (y1; y2) corresponds to
uj (y) =  
2X
i=1
sji (xji   yi)2 ; (1)
where sji corresponds to the weight or strength voter j attaches to issue i. With
respect to these strengths, we assume that sj = (sj1; sj2) 2 S S = fs0; s1; : : : ; scg
fs0; s1; : : : ; scg, with 0  s0 < s1 < : : : < sc  1. In this model voter preferences
are completely identied by (xj; sj) 2 X  S2. A particular conguration of voters
is generated by drawing, for each voter j, an ideal position xj from the discrete
uniform distribution on X (hence their is no correlation between the positions on the
di¤erent issues) and strengths sji from a discrete distribution on S (hence strengths
are uncorrelated).
Given the initial conguration of voters an electoral landscape can be constructed
as follows. There are two political parties entering the election, the incumbent and
the challenger. It is assumed that the incumbent does not change its policy from
the previous period. Each voter votes for the political candidate yielding him the
highest utility as given by (1). Then for each position the height of the electoral
landscape is determined as the fraction of voters voting for the challenger, if it would
select that position. That is, we can dene h (z j y) as the fraction of the votes the
challenger gets if the incumbent is at platform y and if the challenger selects platform
z. For every policy position z with h (z j y) > (<) 1
2
, the challenger wins (loses) the
election. For a policy position with h (z j y) = 1
2
, the challenger wins with probability
1
2
. The objective for the challenger is to nd high points of the electoral landscape.
This is consistent with a situation where candidates are only interested in getting
elected and therefore search for the highest position (which will make them harder
to beat in the next election if they win this election). The problem of the challenger
therefore reduces to a search problem: it has to nd the (local) optimum of some
complicated nonlinear function (i.e. the electoral landscape h (: j y)). Instead of
assuming that political parties or candidaties have complete information about the
electoral landscape, which seems rather farfetched anyway, we follow Kollman, Miller
and Page (1992) in assuming that political parties have incomplete information about
voter preferences and select policy platforms adaptively. We consider the following
adaptive search procedure. The challenger randomly draws a number of positions
from the issue space and runs a poll there. Such a poll consists of, for example, a
randomly drawn 10% of the voters. The challenger observes the fraction of this poll
which favors his policy over the incumbents policy and uses this as an estimate of
the true height of the electoral landscape at that position. If the best polling result
indicates a height of at least 1
2
then the challenger chooses that position. Otherwise
it chooses the incumbent position, where it has probability 1
2
of winning the election.
If the true height of the landscape at the position selected by the challenger is above
(below) 1
2
, the challenger (incumbent) wins the election. If the height is exactly 1
2
,
each political party has a probability 1
2
of winning the election. This procedure is
repeated for each election that follows.
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2.2 Interest groups
The observation that political parties are incompetely informed about voter prefer-
ences introduces an incentive for special interest groups to emerge. In this paper we
will, rather than just assuming that these interest groups exist and their preferences
and size (i.e. inuence) are given exogenously, model interest groups as endogenously
emerging institutions, arising from social pressure and herd behaviour of individual
agents. Interest groups have several types of functions. Firstly, through these interest
groups the voting behaviour of the members is coordinated. Secondly, they provide
information to the political candidates in order to inuence the outcome of the elec-
tion process. Our approach therefore di¤ers from most of the literature on interest
groups which focuses on lobbying and campaign contributions and uses game theoretic
models to describe the interaction between political parties and interest groups (for
surveys of this literature we refer to Austen-Smith (1994) and van Winden (1999)).
Interest groups emerge in our model of spatial competition as follows. Voters
with the same ideal position on one of the issues, say the rst issue, may decide to
organize in interest groups in order to play a, hopefully pivotal, role in determining
the election outcome. Notice that interest groups are only concerned with one issue.
Now let nik be the total number of voters having position k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg on issue
i 2 f1; 2g. Clearly, we have PKk=1 n1k = PKk=1 n2k = N . Now along each of the
2K lines in the issue space an interest group emerges. Prior to each election a
process of interest group formation takes place. In this process each voter determines
whether he or she will join one or two interest groups. After this process of interest
group formation is over, it is endogenously determined which interest groups become
active. In particular, we assume that this depends upon whether the interest group
has collected enough funds to nancially support one of the candidates.
Each voter is a potential member of two interest groups and has to decide whether
to join none, one or both interest groups. This decision is modelled as follows. The
incentive to join the interest group is that this provides a means to exerting some
political inuence. Clearly, the larger the interest group the higher the probability of
having some inuence, so this incentive is increasing in the number of interest group
members. There may also be some positive feedback because one can identify oneself
with this interest group. Furthermore, we assume that voters are more inclined to
join an interest group if the present policy position on that issue is farther away
from their own position on that issue. On the other hand, there are some costs of
joining the interest group. In this paper we consider the cost of joining as exogenous
and xed1. The process is modeled as follows. Potential interest group members are
drawn in a random order and sequentially determine whether to join or not. This
procedure is repeated once (only for the voters who have not joined), so each voter
has to decide whether to join or not one or two times. Let mik;s 1 be the number of
members of the interest group at position k of issue i after s   1 voters have been
1We can extend this model by incorporating other types of costs as well. For example, joining
an interest group implies following the interest groups advice about how to cast the vote in the
upcoming election, although this might be bad in terms of the election outcome for the other issue.
The costs for somebody joining the interest group therefore depend upon his strength and ideal
position in the other issue (or alternatively, on the relative strength of the relevant issue).
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drawn and have made the decision whether to join a certain interest group or not
(where mk;0  0). The sth voter then decides on the basis of the following general
decision rule
vjs (k) = V
 
k;
mik;s 1
nik
; y
!
(2)
which we specify as
vjs (k) = sji (k   yi)2 exp
 
1 +
mik;s 1
nik
!
  c (3)
where c corresponds to exogenous costs or benets that are incurred by joining an
interest group. Notice that the incentive to join the interest group increases with
the strength sji, increases with the distance between the incumbents platform yi and
the voters ideal position on the issue (k) and increases with the size of the interest
group. Each potential interest groups undergoes a similar formation process, leading
to 2K di¤erent interest groups, each of which has a certain size.
Now that we have modeled the emergence of interest groups, let us consider their
functioning. In our model interest groups inuence the election process in three ways:
they coordinate the voting behavior of their members, they provide information about
the electoral landscape to the political candidates, and they try to inuence policy
outcome by imposing conditions on polling. Let us rst discuss what information they
provide. Each interest group possesses certain funds raised by contribution fees c of
its members. These funds are o¤ered to the challenger conditional on: i) running a
certain number of polls in policy positions coinciding with the interest groups position
on the relevant issues; ii) commitment of the challenger to select the platform with
the highest poll result, provided this platform has a height of at least 1
2
.
The interest groups members voting behaviour is coordinated as follows. When
the platforms of the two political parties are known the active interest groups decide
which party to support and then all members of the interest group vote for that
party (if a voter is a member of more than one active interest group that support
di¤erent candidates, it follows the interest group giving him the highest benet vjm).
Each interest group decides which party to support as follows. If exactly one of the
candidates takes the interest groups position on the relevant issue, the interest group
supports that party. If one candidate is closer to the interest groups position than the
other candidate, the former is supported. If both candidates have the same position
as the interest group, or the distance from the interest groups positions on the relevant
issue is the same, the interest group members votes according to their own utility,
as given by (1). Clearly, the presence of interest groups may change the electoral
landscape. As a matter of fact, interest group members voting behavior changes from
being consistent with preferences induced by weighted Euclidean ditance to being
consistent with lexicographic preferences.
During an electoral campaign, apart from the conditioned platforms where polls
are nanced by interest groups, the challenger is assumed to run some polls on plat-
forms selected randomly in the issue space. It then selects that policy position which
has the best polling result. All voters organized in interest groups vote for the party
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supported by the interest group, voters that belong to more than one interest group
follow the interest group with the highest value of (3), all other voters vote according
to the weighted euclidean distance from the di¤erent policy positions to their ideal
points, as in (1). The party with the majority of votes wins the election.
3 Mean dynamics
The adaptive electoral competition model described in Section 2 generates a di¤erent
election dynamics for each realization of ideal points and strengths and hence depends
critically upon the initial conguration of the population of voters. For extensive simi-
lations of this model and a number of extensions we refer to Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van
Winden (2004). In the present paper we will focus on deriving some analytical results
that may explain the outcome of these simulations. In particular, we will perform
a mean-eld approximation to this stochastic system, the so-called mean dynamics,
which generates a stationary Markov process. The stationary states and the dynam-
ics of the Markov process, which actually amounts to what happens in expectation
in the model, can be studied and give useful information about what happens in the
stochastic electoral competition models with all their iindividual diosyncrasies. The
Markov process therefore can be viewed as the skeleton of the original process.
3.1 Electoral competition as a Markov process
We have a population of N voters, with ideal positions xj drawn from the uniform
discrete distribution on X = f1; 2; : : : ; Kgf1; 2; : : : ; Kg, where K is some odd num-
ber (which implies that the centerof the issue space C = (C1; C2) 
 
K+1
2
; K+1
2

is,
in fact, an element of X ). Furthermore, voters have strengths sj = (sj1; sj2) 2 S  S.
We assume that strengths are identically and independently drawn from a discrete
distribution p on S, and therefore, ps = Pr(Sj1 = sj1; Sj2 = sj2) = Pr(Sj1 =
sj1) Pr(Sj2 = sj2) = ps1ps2 : Also observe that the distribution of strengths is in-
dependent of ideal positions.
Let yt 1 2 X be the incumbents platform for the election at time t, that is yt 1
is the winning platform of the election at time t   1. In the following denition we
dene a new state space.
Denition 1 Let R = fR : 9i1; i2 2 f1; : : : ; Kg s.t. R2 = i21 + i22g. Now dene by
U = fUR; R 2 Rg, the family of subsets of X with elements
U (R) =

x 2 X : (x1   C1)2 + (x2   C2)2 = R2
	
:
The idea behind using U should be clear. We are not so much interested in the
actual platforms that have been selected but more in the distance of these platforms
from the center C of the distribution. Moreover, due to symmetry, all platforms that
are equally distant from C (i.e. that belong to the same element UR) can be treated
similarly. Notice that the number of elements of U is n =P 12 (K+1)k=1 k, which clearly is
much smaller than jX j = K2. Moreover, it is easily checked that each element of U
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contains 1, 4 or 8 elements of X The following proposition claims that the electoral
dynamics corresponds to a Markov chain on U .
Proposition 2 The family U satises the following properties.
i) It forms a partition for the space X .
ii) For all R and R0 and for all yt; (yt)0 2 UR,
Pr
 
yt+1 2 UR0 j yt

= Pr

yt+1 2 UR0 j
 
yt
0
:
Proof. Straightforward.
According to the second property of U , the probability of moving from any plat-
form z in UR to platforms in UR0 is independent of the particular platform z.
The electoral competition now corresponds to a Markov process with stationary
transition probabilities on U . The next step is to derive the transition matrix for
this Markov process. Now denote the n elements of U as fU1; U2; U3; : : : ; Ung 
U (0) ; U (1) ; U
 p
2

; : : : ; U
 p
2K
	
. We can then, for given political instutions,
voter preferences and the interest group formation process, compute an n n transi-
tion matrix Pr, where the index r gives the number of polls. Element (i; j) of Pr gives
the probability that, when the incumbent is in Ui, the election outcome will be in
Uj. Notice that the randomness in the system is, given the initial position of the The
transition matrix Pr can gives us a lot of information about the election dynamics,
as will become clear shortly.
Now let the initial policy platform, y0, follow some discrete distribution 0 on U
(where 0 might for example be generated by the uniform distribution on X ). The
electoral outcome evolves according to the transition probabilities given by Pr and at
election t the distribution of policy platforms over the di¤erent states Ui is given by
t = 0 (Pr)
t :
Apart from the limiting behavior and the transient dynamics of this Markov process,
we are, for every time period t, interested in two particular variables namely the
distance of the incumbent from the center of the issue space, and the probability for
the challenger to win the election atof the MFurthermore, given the distribution t of
policy platforms at time t, the average distance between the policy platform yt and
the center C is given by
E
 yt   C =X
R2R
Rt:
The probability that the challenger wins at an election t is
Pr (the challenger wins at time t) = tw;
where w = (wR)R2R with
wR = Pr (challenger wins j incumbents position y is an element of UR) :
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An algorithm outlining how to compute the transition matrix Pr and the vector w,
for the di¤erent models can be found in the Appendix.
In the next two subsection we will investigate the mean dynamics for the bench-
mark model and the interest group model for one typical specication. We take
K = 5, and S = 0; 1
2
; 1
	
. Strengths are drawn from S according to the following dis-
tribution Pr (sji = 0) = Pr (sji = 1) = 14 and Pr
 
sji =
1
2

= 1
2
, for j 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng.
Let the initial platform y0 be drawn from the uniform distribution on the issue space
X = f1; : : : ; 5g  f1; : : : ; 5g. The statepace for the Markov process in this case be-
comes
U =
n
UR j R 2
n
0; 1;
p
2; 2;
p
5; 2
p
2
oo
:
and, under the assumption that y0 is drawn from a uniform distribution on X we
have 0 =

1
25
; 4
25
; 4
25
; 4
25
; 8
25
; 4
25

:
3.2 Dynamics for the benchmark model
Using the algorithm given in the appendix, we have computed the transition matrices
Pr and the vector w(r) of probabilities with which the challenger is expected to win,
for two di¤erent values of the number of random polls, r:
 r = 2;
P2 =
0BBBBBB@
1 0 0 0 0 0
0:080 0:920 0 0 0 0
0:080 0:287 0:633 0 0 0
0:077 0:270 0:253 0:400 0 0
0:073 0:273 0:248 0:175 0:230 0
0:07 0:253 0:237 0:147 0:273 0:020
1CCCCCCA ; w(2) =
0BBBBBB@
0:50000
0:53999
0:68333
0:80000
0:90833
0:99000
1CCCCCCA
and
 r = 10,
P10 =
0BBBBBB@
1 0 0 0 0 0
0:400 0:600 0 0 0 0
0:400 0:543 0:057 0 0 0
0:250 0:495 0:253 0:002 0 0
0:152 0:533 0:308 0:006 0:001 0
0:090 0:407 0:422 0:001 0:080 0
1CCCCCCA ; w(10) =
0BBBBBB@
0:50000
0:70000
0:97174
0:99878
1:0000
1:00000
1CCCCCCA
where 1:0000 refers to 0:999998 which has been set to 1 in rounding. Let Pr(i; j)
be the element in the i-th row and j-th column of Pr: Then P nr (i; i) = [Pr(i; i)]
n,
since Pr is a lower diagonal matrix. Hence, for all i = 2; : : : ; 6;
P
n P
n
r (i; i) <1 as a
geometric series with term jPr(i; i)j < 1. Thus all states UR; R > 0 are transient since
from the theory of Markov Chains, transience (persistence) of a state j is equivalent toP
n P
n(j; j) <1 (=1)(see Billingsley (1986, p.114)). Furthermore, P11 = 1 implies
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that fU0g is a closed2 set and U0 a persistent state. Thus, we have that the stationary
distribution is  = [1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0]; and in the long run: (i) the policy platform will
end up in the center position C and stay there forever; and (ii) the probability the
challenger wins at an election converges to 0:5(= limt!1 tw = w = w0):3
3.3 Dynamics for the model with interest groups
Interest groups inuence the elections process in three ways: (i) they coordinate the
voting behavior of their members; (ii) they provide information about the electoral
landscape to the political parties; and (iii) they try to inuence the policy outcome
via conditions on polling. In order to be able to disentangle the impact of the latter
from the rst two we present the dynamic analysis of the model with interest groups
for two di¤erent polling procedures: conditionalpolling and unconditionalpolling.
3.3.1 Unconditional polling
We start with recalling how the voting behaviour of an interest groups members is
coordinated. When the platforms of the two political parties are known the active
interest groups decide which party to support and then all members of the interest
group vote for that party (if a voter is a member of two active interest groups that
support di¤erent candidates, then that voter is assumed to follow the interest group
with the highest benet vjm; as in the previous section). Each interest group decides
which party to support as follows. If exactly one of the candidates takes the interest
groups position on the relevant issue, the interest group supports that party. If
one candidate is closer to the interest groups position than the other candidate, the
former is supported. If both candidates have the same position as the interest group,
or the distance from the interest group positions on the relevant issue is the same,
the interest group members votes according to their own utility, as given by (1). Our
rst research question is to investigate the e¤ects of the new (if any) properties of the
electoral landscape in the dynamics of the electoral outcomes. For this we assume
that the challenger runs r random polls. It should be clear by now that this case
is exactly the same as the basic one, corrected for the strength proles of interest
group members changing from s to (1; 0) or (0; 1). The transition matrix, P I10 and
the vector, wI10u of winning probabilities for the model with interest groups, turns out
to be
P I10u =
0BBBBBB@
1:000 0 0 0 0 0
0:152 0:848 0 0 0 0
0:400 0:425 0:176 0 0 0
0:007 0:443 0:407 0:142 0 0
0:152 0:444 0:307 0:007 0:090 0
0:028 0:407 0:542 0 0:023 0
1CCCCCCA ; w
I
(10u) =
0BBBBBB@
0:50000
0:99878
0:99985
1:00000
1:00000
1:00000
1CCCCCCA
2A set B in S is closed if
P
j2B P (i; j) = 1 for i 2 B : once the system enters B it cannot leave
(see Billingsley (1986, p.140)).
3Recall that we have assumed that, if the challenger does not nd a platform with h (z j y) > 0:5,
it chooses the incumbents platform y, and wins with probability 0:5.
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where 0 refers to 0:00002, which has been set to 0 in rounding. As for the basic
model, we nd that there is one and only one closed set, the elements of which are
all persistent states, which is fU0g: All states U 2 UnU0 are transient. However,
there is a di¤erence in the speed with which the system convergence to the center
as the following shows. Figures 1 and 2 give, for the 3 di¤erent cases, diagrams
with E (kyt   Ck) and Pr (the challenger wins at time t), respectively. First consider
Figure 1. From the highest to the lowest curve we have: benchmark model with 2
random polls, interest group model with 10 random polls, benchhmark model with
10 random polls. We can draw the following conclusions from this gure. Firstly,
an increase in the number of (unconditional) polls decreases the expected separation
between the winning platform and the center of the distribution. Secondly, for the
interest group model expected separation is larger than for the basic model with the
same number of polls. For Figure 2 the highest to the lowest curve (as measured at
election 6) are respectively: the interest group model with 10 random polls, the basic
model with 10 polls and the basic model with 2 polls. From this it follows that the
presence of interest groups increases the probability of winning an election. One of
the ndings in Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden (2004) was that the presence of
interest groups appears to increase the winning set. That result is conrmed here as
well. Given the state of the incumbent, we nd that the size of the winning set equals:
(a)
 
0 1 5 9 14 21
0
for the basic model, and (b)
 
0 9 11 17 19 22
0
for the model with interest groups (recall that jX j = 25): Note that since fU0g is a
closed set, if the incumbent is in U0 = fCg then the winning set is empty 0. These
gures show that except for the case in which the incumbents platform is in U0, the
size of the winning set increases in the presence of interest groups.4
Time series of the expected probabilites with which the challenger defeats the
incumbent.
3.3.2 Conditional polling
As mentioned above, the interest groups inuence the election process by providing
information about the electoral landscape to the political parties. Let us recall what
information they provide. Each interest group possesses certain funds raised by the
contributions c of its members. These funds are o¤ered to the challenger conditional
on: i) running a number of polls5 in policy positions coinciding with the interest
groups position on the relevant issue; ii) commitment of the challenger to select
the platform with the highest poll result, if this platform has a height of at least
1
2
. Furthermore, it is assumed that each interest group knows the median of the
distribution of its groups members on the other issue and nances a poll there. Let
r1 be the number of random polls and r2 the number of conditioned polls. Let the
challenger rst run r2 conditioned polls and then r1 random polls. Removing from the
policy space the positions where the conditioned polls are run, and using formulas (5),
4The result is robust to changes in all parameter settings we have investigated. We have de-
rived similar results for di¤erent distributions p on S; and di¤erent number of positions per issue
(K 2 f3; : : : ; 11g) :
5Remember that the number of polls that an interest group can nance is determined by the cost
of running a poll and the size of the fund that the group possesses.
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Figure 1: Time series of the expected distance between the incumbent and the center
of the space.
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Figure 2: Time series of the expected probabilities with which the challenger defeats
the incumbent.
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Issue 2
5
4
3
2
1
  :538  
  :590 :538 :508
 :500 :575 :500 
  :590 :538 :508
  :538  
1 2 3 4 5
Issue 1
Table 1: Fractions of voters who prefer a position z = (i; j) to (2; 3) ( refers to
fractions less than 0:5).
(7) and (8), one can compute the transition probabilities for the conditional polling
procedure.
For the specied model and r2 = 8; r1 = 2, we nd
P I10c =
0BBBBBB@
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0:882 0:118 0 0 0
1CCCCCCA ; w
I
10c =
0BBBBBB@
0:5
1
1
1
1
1
1CCCCCCA
A new persistent state appears. In addition to state U0 which remains a persistent
state with the property fU0g is a closed set, state U1 becomes a persistent state
as well with the property fU1g is a closed set. This can be derived as follows.
The transition matrix shows that if the system at election t is in one of the states
UR; R 2 f1; 2;
p
5g; then at election t + 1 it will be in U1 and stay there forever. If
the system starts at U2p2 then, with probability 0:882; in the coming election it will
end up in U1 and never leave that state. The probability that the system will settle
in U1 is given by the rst coordinate of 0P I10c and equals 0:781. In the same way
one can derive that the system will settle in U0 with probability 0:219. Furthermore,
let the incumbent platform be y = (2; 3) 2 U1:6 Table (1) shows the fraction of votes
that the challenger gets if he selects a position z = (i; j), i; j = 1; : : : ; 5; ( refers
to fractions of votes smaller than 0:5). Thus, the winning set that corresponds to a
position y 2 U1 has always at least two elements from U1 with the highest fraction of
votes. Let us now consider the interest group located at position 2 on the second issue.
From the uniformity of the distribution of voters in the space and the homogeneity7
of voters within types, it follows that the median of the members of this interest
group related to the rst issue is located at 3. Hence, that interest group will nance
a poll at position (3; 2). Note that the altitude at (3; 2) is :59; which is the highest
value in Table (1): Thus, the incumbent platform in the coming election will be either
(3; 2) or (3; 4). This means that although the incumbent does not leave the U1 set,
6It should be clear (for reasons of symmetry) that Table (1) for a y 2 U1 is the same as the one
derived by rotating Table (1) around the center (3; 3) until (2; 3) reaches y.
7Voters of some type s and with the same ideal positions on some issue i; make the same decisions
to join the relevant interest group.
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a voting cycle appears. Therefore we may conclude that, with probability :781; (i) a
cycle emerges and (ii) the challenger wins with probability 1.
4 Voting cycles driven by interest groups
The mean dynamicanalysis from the previous section shows that for the specied
parameters of the models, there is only one closed set, fU0g in the basic case. However,
under conditional polling, there are two closed sets, fU0g and fU1g; for the model
with interest groups. This raises the question of the dependence of this result on the
parameter specication, like the size of the space, the set of strengths, the probability
distribution of strengths on that set and so on. The following analysis provides an
answer to that question.
Proposition 3 Assume votersideal positions are independently (across issues and
across voters) drawn from the uniform distribution on X and voters strengths are
independently drawn from a discrete distribution on S and are uncorrelated with the
ideal positions. Denote by y = (y1; y2) the platform of the incumbent. We then have:
1. (a) For both models (with and without interest groups), Z+0:5 (C) = ; and
Z00:5 (C) = U0:
(b) For the basic model, 8 y 2 XnfCg; C 2 Z+0:5 (y) ;
2. If the distribution of strengths satises
(1  1
K
)
P
s2Snf0g p
2
s +
 
3
2
  1
K
P
(s1=s2)=2
ps1ps2P
s2Snf0g ps
>
1
2
(4)
then in the presence of interest groups, 8y 2 U1;9y0 2 U1nfyg, such that h(y0 j
y) > h(z j y); for all z 2 [R2Rnf1gUR:
Proof. see the Appendix
Corollary 4 For the specied models, Proposition 3 applies.
Proof. Indeed, substitutingK = 5,
P
s2Snf0g p
2
s = (1=2
2 + 1=42) ;
P
(s1=s2)=2
ps1ps2 =
1=8; and
P
s2Snf0g ps = 3=4 at the lhs of the inequality (4), we nd a value of 0:55
which is bigger than 0:5 which is the value of the rhs of (4).
In words, Corollary 4 shows that for the specied models, analyzed in Section
3, the following properties hold: (i) 3.1(b) implies that for the basic model, for any
incumbent position y; di¤erent from C, position C has an altitude larger than 0:5;
and hence belongs to the winning set of y; (ii) 3.1(a) implies that for both models, if
the incumbent is at C, then any position that is not in U0 has an altitude strictly less
than 0:5; and hence it does not belong to the winning set of C; and (iii) 3.2 implies
that in the presence of interest groups, there is at least one position y0 in U1 which is
di¤erent from y and has altitude larger than any other position that does not belong
to U1 provided that property (4) is satised.
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Proposition 5 1. For both models, with and without groups, fU0g is a closed set
and U0 is a persistent state,
2. For the model without interest groups, all other states, U 2 U nU0 are transient,
3. Assume that the distribution of strengths has property (4): In the presence of
interest groups and given conditional polling,
(a) fU1g is a closed set and U1 is a persistent state, and
(b) voting cycles emerge once the incumbent visits U1:
Corollary 4 implies that the Proposition 5 is relevant for the specied models.
Hence, the results shown in Section 3 can be easily derived by applying Proposition
5.
We conclude that our models have all the properties presented in Proposition 5
for all specications of parameters that satisfy condition (4).
5 Simulations and empirical illustration
The law of large numbers ensures us that the mean-analysis is relevant for populations
that are large enough to correct for random deviations. However, the population of
voters may not be large enough to cancel out random uctuations, and therefore, the
law of large numbers may not apply. This may have consequences at the macrolevel.
That is why in this section we will consider some simulations for di¤erent realizations
of voter preferences and investigate whether the predictions of Proposition 5 are valid.
Furthermore, we will compare these simulation results to some empirically observed
policy outcomes.
Each trial starts with drawing a population of 1000 voters from the uniform distri-
bution on X , where we again assume K = 5. The initial position of the incumbent is
chosen to be the center, in order to be able to investigate the closeness property (see
footnote 3) of this center for the di¤erent models. Each trial was run for 20 elections
and we have done 20 di¤erent trials. Typical results are represented in panels (a)-(d)
of Figure 3. Panels (a) and (b) show that in the basic model the incumbent remains
at the center for all elections. This is a robust feature of all trials with the basic
model. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3 show that in the interest group model some-
thing di¤erent occurs: counter to the rst statement in Proposition 5, the incumbent
leaves the center and positions itself at some other position. This happens in more
than half of all trials.
From these gures it is apparent that for the basic model, the set that contains the
center of the issue space, fCg, is a closed set even for the stochastic model. However,
for the interest group model, the center loses that property for certain realizations of
the distribution of voter preferences. For our issue space of 25 positions, simulations
show that: for the basic model the property that fU0g is a closed set is maintained
if the size of the population is larger than 300; for the model with interest groups,
fU0g and fU1g are closed sets if the size of the population is larger than 10000:
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Figure 3: The stability of the center:simulation and empirical data. Panels (a) and
(b) show data generated from the benchmark model in simulations 13 and 14, respec-
tively. Panels (c) and (d) show data generated from the model with interest groups
in simulations 13 and 14, respectively. Panels (e) and (f) show data generated from
the composition of the governments in Finland and Iceland, respectively.
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For populations with size smaller than 1000; neither fU0g nor fU1g are closed sets.
Our next step is to relate these simulation results to some empirical data on policy
outcomes. An analysis of the policy outcomes for 20 European countries was done
in Woldendorp, Keman and Budge (1998). They classied the composition of the
government as falling into one of 5 categories, ranging from extreme left (category 1)
to extreme right (category 5). The graphs represented in panels (e) and (f) of Figure
3, respectively, correspond to Iceland data and Finland data, starting with the rst
time the composition of the government is in the center (position 3) after 1960.
We draw attention to two features present in the data from both countries: (i) the
government composition stays longer at position 3 than at the other positions, that
is, the center presents a position which is hard to be defeated from other positions;
(ii) although the government composition locates at 3 it does not stay there forever,
that is, the center can be defeated. Comparing these graphs to the graphs generated
by the simulations it is clear that the data generated by the interest group model
represents the empirical data best. In our view, this may provide some support for
the model with interest groups presented in Section 2.
6 Concluding remarks
Although simulations provide a valuable aid in characterizing the systems behavior,
their power is limited to the domain of the selected parameters. An understanding of
the more generic properties of individual-based models requires the use of determinis-
tic approximation models. In this paper we have applied a mean-eld approximation
to the stochastic models presented in Section 2, by replacing the values of the random
variables by their expected values. This leads to deterministic dynamic models of the
Markov type. The main results obtained from the analysis of the deterministic
models are as follows. The dynamics of the distance between the policy outcome
and the center of the space, and of the probability that the challenger wins an elec-
tion, replicate qualitatively the respective dynamics generated by the individual-based
models. For both models, with and without interest groups, the set consisting of the
center of the space presents a closed set. For a certain class of probability distri-
butions on a set of strengths S and under conditional polling, it is shown that (i)
the set of positions at distance 1 from the center is a closed set for the model with
interest groups, and (ii) a voting cycle emerges. For the specied model the voting
cycle appears with probability :781. Simulations show that for populations of size
smaller than 1000 neither the center nor the 4 positions (at distance 1) closest to the
center present closed sets for the model with interest groups. Voting cycles become
frequent phenomena and expand all over the issue space,8 due to the deviations of
the realizations of the random variables (the distributions of voters preferences) from
the mean values. To our knowledge, this is the rst study pointing at, and providing
a micro-foundation for, the possibility of a voting cycle in the presence of a dominant
point. Although for di¤erent reasons, our work contributes to research in the spa-
tial theory of elections that advocates that ...democratic voting is characterized by
8Interested readers can contact the author for animations that illustrate this behaviour.
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forces that keep outcomes reasonably close to the center of voter opinion... (Enelow
and Hinich (1984, p. 223)). A further investigation shows however, that if the size
of the population is lower than some threshold (1000 for our specied model) voting
cycles become frequent phenomena and expand all over the issue space. Thus for
small populations, our model positions itself in the series of models that point at the
electoral instability of voting outcomes (McKelvey (1976, 1979), Schoeld (1978)).
The inherent property driving our results is that the winning set (i.e., the set of
policy platforms that will defeat the current incumbent) increases in the presence
of interest groups. This happens in all the stochastic and numerical simulations.
Moreover, in Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden (2005b) it is rigorously shown that,
in a slightly di¤erent spatial competition framework and under certain mild conditions
on the incumbents position, the winning set for the challenger indeed increases when
interest groups are present to coordinate voting behavior.
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Appendix
An algorithm for determining the transition matrix
Let yt be the platform of the incumbent after election t. In order to compute the
transition probabilities, rst we need to compute the height of the electoral landscape
for any position z in the issue space, given the incumbents platform yt, i.e. we need
h (z j yt) for all z.
1. Denote by u(z j x; s)  =  P2i=1 si(xi   zi)2 the utility that a voter with ideal
position x and vector of strengths s derives from the policy z when implemented.
For each position z 2 X ; the height of the electoral landscape h (z j yt) is given
by the following formula
h(z j yt) =
X
x2X ;s2S

Pr(X = x; S = s)G
 
u (z j x; s)  u  yt j x; s ; (5)
where
G (v) =
8<:
1
1
2
0
v > 0
v = 0
v < 0
: (6)
In words, the above formula can be described as: rst, take a position x and
count with weight 1(1=2) voters with ideal position x that strictly prefer (are
indi¤erent between) policy z to yt; next, take the weighted sum of the above
gures for all x 2 X : The outcome gives the fraction of votes that the challenger
is expected to get if he selects z given that the incumbent platform is yt:
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2. Dene
Z0l (y) = fz 2 X j h(z j y) = lg ;
Z+l (y) = fz 2 X j h(z j y) > lg ;
Z l (y) = fz 2 X j h(z j y) < lg :
That is, the set Z0l (y) (Z
+
l (y), Z
 
l (y)) contains all positions for which, given
the platform of the incumbent, the height of the electoral landscape is equal to
(larger than, smaller than) l. Notice that these sets are disjoint and Z0l (y) [
Z+l (y) [ Z l (y) = X for all l and y. Obviously, yt+1 2 Z00:5 (yt) [ Z+0:5 (yt)
and the set W (yt) of positions that defeat the incumbent at yt is given by
W (yt) = Z+0:5 (y
t) :
Let the challenger run r polls. Denote by T  X the set of positions that is
polled by the challenger. The transition probabilities can now be computed
as follows. First, we compute the probability pl that the challenger selects a
position from the set Z0l (y). That event happens if the challenger runs: (a)
at least one poll at a position z from Z0l (y) and (b) no polls at positions from
Z+l (y). That is
pl = Pr
 
T \ Z0l (y) 6= ; and T \ Z+l (y) = ;

(7)
which, in case of random polling becomes
pl =
rX
k=1

r
k

Pr
 T \ Z0l (y) = kPr  T \ Z l (y) = r   k
=
rX
k=1

r
k
Qk 1
i=0 max fjZ0l (y)j   i; 0g
Qr k 1
j=0 max
Z l (y)  j; 0	Qr 1
m=0 (K
2  m) :
Thus, in other words we have derived the probability that the highest altitude
in the polling process equals l.
Next, dene L (y;R0)  l  1
2
j UR0 \ Z0l (y) 6= ;
	
. The transition probabili-
ties then can be computed as
Pr (UR0 ; UR) = Pr
 
yt+1 2 U(R0) yt 2 U(R) = X
l2L(yt;R0)
pl
jZ0l (yt)j
G

l   1
2

;
(8)
with G as dened in (6).
The probabilities given by (8) dene a (stationary) jUj  jUj transition matrix
Pr; where jUj :denotes the cardinality of the set U
For example, for the benchmark model we have Pr (X = x) = 1
K2
and Pr (S = s) =
ps1ps2 as given before. For these specications (5) becomes
h(z j yt) =
X
s2S;x2X
ps
K2
G
 
u (z j x; s)  u  yt j x; s :
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Election dynamics of the Markov chain
Let the initial platform, y0 be drawn from a discrete distribution 0 on U . The
electoral outcome evolves according to the above transition probabilities and at elec-
tion t we have that the incumbent is expected to be in one of the states UR according
to the following distribution
t = 0 (Pr)
t :
Furthermore, at each election t > 0, the incumbent is expected to be at distance
d(yt; C) from the center of the distribution of voter preferences given by
E
 yt   C =X
R2R
Rt:
The probability that the challenger wins at an election t is
Pr (the challenger wins at time t) = tw;
where w = (wR)R2R with
wR =
1
2
Pr
 
yt+1 2 Z00:5
 
yt
 j yt 2 UR+ Pr  yt+1 2 Z+0:5  yt j yt 2 UR :
Proof of Proposition 3
1. Let a position z 6= C be given. Denote by voters of type s all voters with a
certain strength vector s 2 S  S: Consider rst the basic model. For each
strength prole s 2 S  S, we can identify the line ls of ideal points, going
through (z + C) =2, for which voters of type s will be indi¤erent between z
and C. Each of those lines separates the space into two disjoint subspaces, one
of which contains z and the other contains C, unless both C and z belong to
ls. The uniform distribution of ideal points implies that for all s; if C =2 ls
(C 2 ls) then the subspace where C lies contains more than (at least) half
of the voters of type s, and all of them by construction prefer (are indi¤erent
between) C to z. Since the set of strengths has at least two elements and
z 6= C there is at least one ls such that C =2 ls and thus in expectations, while
competing with C; z gets less than half of the votes, i.e. z =2 Z+0:5 (C)[Z00:5 (C) :
By assumption the challenger and the incumbent share votes if they adopt the
same position and hence, Z+0:5 (C) = ; and Z
0
0:5 (C) = fCg: Thus, 3.1(a) for the
basic model is shown. Furthermore, since more than half of the voters prefer C
to z, C 2 Z+0:5 (z), 3.1(b) is proven.
Consider now the model with interest groups. To show that for all positions z
such that z 6= C; the property z =2 Z+0:5 (C) holds we do the following. Without
loss of generality (due to the symmetry in the model) let zi  Ci; i = 1; 2: First,
for all s 2 S  S; draw lines l  and l+ through C as dened in Denition 6
from Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden (2005b). Next, using Lemma 3 from
Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden (2005b) note that for the given z: (i) there
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can be no voters of type s with ideal positions either to the right of l  or at C
that would prefer z to C; and that (ii) voters of type s with ideal positions on
l nfCg would be indi¤erent between joining either group and hence C and z
would get each half of those voters. Finally, consider all types of voters s 2 S;
and properties (i) and (ii) for each of s 2 S; and derive that less than half of
the voters of type s would vote for z versus C; i:e: z =2 Z+0:5 (C)[Z00:5 (C) : That
C 2 Z00:5 (C) is clear.
2. Let y 2 U1 and a position z 2 [R 6=1UR be given. To x the idea, let y =
(C1; C2 + 1) and z1  y1: First we calculate h (C j y). For this, note that the
center C would get votes from voters of type s 2 S = fs 2 S  S; s2 6= 0g;
with ideal positions below the horizontal line going through the point myC =
(C1;
y2+C2
2
): Since there are K (K + 1) =2 such positions,9 and since the prob-
ability that a voter has a vector of strengths s 2 S is Ps22Snf0g ps2 = 1   p0,
we derive that K(K+1)
2K2
(1  p0) is the fraction of voters who prefer C to y: Fur-
thermore, the rest of voters would have: (a) either both strengths equal to 0;
and therefore would vote randomly, or (b) the strength in the rst issue s1 6= 0
and in the second one, s2 = 0, and since y1 = C1 would again be indi¤erent
between positions C and y. Thus p0
2
is the fraction of voters with s2 = 0 that C
is expected to get. We can therefore conclude that the fraction of the votes the
challenger gets if the incumbent is at platform y and if the challenger selects
position z is given by
h (C j y) = 1
2
+
1  p0
2K
(>
1
2
): (9)
Furthermore, a similar argument shows that if z1 = y1, then h (z j y) < h (C j y) :
Second, we show that there is a y0 2 U1 such that the challenger gets a higher
fraction of the voters by selecting y0 rather than C: Take y0 = (C1 1; C2): Let a
vector of strengths, s 2 S  S be given. Draw lines l ; l+ through y as dened in
Denition 6 of Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden (2005b). The same reasoning
as the one used in the proof of Proposition 4 from Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van
Winden (2005b). However, in this case the triangles dened there correspond
to empty sets and all positions to the left of l  will vote for y0. Furthermore,
all voters on positions on l , but di¤erent from y vote for the challenger at y0
with probability 1
2
. This implies that all voters with strength vector s and ideal
positions in the subspace V (y0; y; s) =
h
1;
y01+y1
2
i
 [1;minfK; l g][
h
y01+y1
2
; K
i
h
1;min
n
y02+y2
2
; l+; l 
oi
; would vote for y0 rather than y, except for those on the
borders l ;
y01+C1
2
or y
0
2+y2
2
who vote with probability 1
2
for the challenger. We
classify s in the following disjoint sets.
(a) Sa = fs 2 S  S; s1 = s2 6= 0g: First note that for all s 2 Sa; l  is the
same. Then, using the principle of mathematical induction, we derive that
9This can be easily shown by using the principle of mathematical induction. That is: rst, show
that the property holds for K = 3; next, show that if the property holds for a K, then it does for
K + 2 as well.
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the number of positions in V (y; s) that do not belong to l  equals
K(K+1)
2
and the number of ones on line l  is given by K   2. Thus, the fraction of
votes that y0 is expected to get from voters of type s 2 Sa is given by
h (y0 j y; Sa) =

K(K + 1)
2
+
K   2
2
X
s2Sa
ps
K2
:
(b) Sb = fs 2 S  S; s2 > s1 6= 0g :
h
 
y0 j y; Sb  K2 + 1
2
+K   1
X
s2Sb
ps
K2
:
(c) Sc = fs 2 S  S; s1 = 2s2 6= 0g :
h (y0 j y; Sc) 

K2 + 1
2
+
K   2
2
X
s2Sc
ps
K2
:
(d) Sd = fs 2 S  S; s1 > s2 6= 0; and s1 6= 2s2g :
h
 
y0 j y; Sd  K2 + 1
2
X
s2Sd
ps
K2
(e) Se = fs 2 S  S; s = (0; s2) and s2 6= 0g :
h (y0 j y; Se)  K (K + 1)
2
X
s2Se
ps
K2
:
(f) Sf = fs 2 S  S; s = (s1; 0) and s1 6= 0g :
h (y0 j y; Se)  K (K   1)
2
X
s2Sf
ps
K2
:
(g) Sg = fs 2 S  S; s = (0; 0)g :
h (y0 j y; Se) = K
2
2
X
s2Sg
ps
K2
:
Pooling all types of voters, it can be easily shown that: (i) for all z with z1 < y1
we have
h (z j y) < h (y0 j y) ;
and (ii)
h (y0 j y) =
X
i2fa;b;c;d;e;f;gg
h(y0 j y; Si):
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Using equalities
P
s2[i2ISi ps = 1;
P
s2Sb ps =
P
s2Sc ps+
P
s2Sd ps; and
P
s2Se ps =P
s2Sf ps in manipulations, we have
h (y0 j y) = 1
2
+
1
K2
 
(K   1)
X
s2Sa
ps +

3
2
K   1
X
s2Sc
ps +K
X
s2Sd
ps
!
Using (9), a su¢ cient condition for h (y0 j y) > h (C j y) is given by
1
2
+
1
K2
 
(K   1)
X
s2Sa
ps +

3
2
K   1
X
s2Sc
ps
!
>
1
2
+
(1  p0)
2K
Substituting in the above inequality
P
s2Sa ps =
P
s2Snf0g p
2
s,
P
s2Sc ps =
P
(s1=s2)=2
ps1ps2,
and 1  p0 =
P
s2Snf0g ps; we derive
(1  1
K
)
P
s2Snf0g p
2
s +
 
3
2
  1
K
P
(s1=s2)=2
ps1ps2P
s2Snf0g ps
>
1
2
: (10)
Furthermore, for each Si, i 2 fa; b; c; d; gg, for z1 6= y1, we have
h
 
z j y; Si  h  y0 j y; Si ;
with strict inequality for i = a, and
h (z j y; Se) + h  z j y; Sf  h (y0 j y; Se) + h  y0 j y; Sf :
Aggregating over the di¤erent sets, we nd
h (z j y) < h (y0 j y) :
For z1 = y1 we have
h (z j y) < h (C j y) < h (y0 j y) :
Proof of Proposition 5. First, recall the denitions of a persistent and a
transient state. A state i is persistent if a system starting at i is certain to return to
i. The state i is transient in the opposite case (see Billingsley (1986, p.114)).
1.-2. Apply Proposition 3.
3. (a) Let the process start at U1 and the incumbent be at y 2 U1. First, it can
be easily shown that if a voter j with ideal position xj and a vector of
strengths s joins the interest group on the rst issue then so do all other
voters with ideal positions x, x 2 fx, x1 = xj1g; and vector of strengths
s: In words, we can say that voters with the same vector of strengths and
the same ideal position on one issue are homogenous. Next, the uniformity
distribution and the homogeneity property imply that the median position
on issue i for members of the group on issue 3 i is expected to be y0i. Hence,
under the conditional polling there is a poll run at y0: From Proposition
3.2, there exists a y0 2 U1, such that h(y0j y) > h(z j y); for all z =2 U1;
which implies that the new policy outcome will be y0 2 U1: Thus, U1 is a
persistent state and fU1g is closed.
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(b) Since y0 6= y; voting cycles are generated once the incumbent enters state
U1:
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